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BoliviaWe conduct a controlled ﬁeld experiment in 52 communities in rural Bolivia to investigate the effect that local
authorities have onvoluntary public good provision. In our study, communitymembers pool resources to provide
environmental education material for local schools. We ﬁnd that voluntary contributions increase when demo-
cratically elected local authorities lead by example. The results are driven by two factors: (1) authorities, like
other individuals, givemore when they are called upon to lead thanwhen they give in private, and (2) high lead-
er contributions increase the likelihood that others follow. Both effects are stronger when authorities, as com-
pared to randomly selected community members, lead by example. We explore two underlying sources of
leadership inﬂuence. First, we provide evidence that the effect of a leader's contribution is not limited to signaling
the value of the public good. Second, we examine how leader characteristics affect the likelihood that others fol-
low. Speciﬁcally, our study shows that authority inﬂuence is driven by a combination of formal leadership status,
observable characteristics, and the amount that authorities contribute when they give publicly before others.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
Leaders play a central role in the resolution of collective action prob-
lems. Existing evidence demonstrates that leaders affect growth at the
aggregate level (Jones andOlken, 2005) and inﬂuence the choice of pub-
lic goods provided at the local level (Chattopadhyay and Duﬂo, 2004).
Most studies of leadership and public good provision focus on public
goods that are provided by the government.2 In spite of the importance
of voluntary contributions for the resolution of local-level collective ac-
tion problems, less is known about the effect leaders have on the volun-
tary provision of public goods. Recent work has shown that leaders can
affect voluntary contributions through informal taxation (Olken and
Singhal, 2011), sanction enforcement (Grossman and Baldassarri,
2012), and reciprocity (Beekman et al., 2014). This paper examinesecalde@cgiar.org (M.P. Recalde).
e effect of female leadership on
vestigate the political capture of
) study leadership inﬂuence on
Tomé and Príncipe; and Besley
allocation decisions in India.
. This is an open access article underanother mechanism by which leaders may affect voluntary contribu-
tions to local public goods: leadership by example.
In a voluntary contribution setting, leadership by example arises
when individuals make sequential decisions, and the choice made by
the ﬁrst mover (the leader) inﬂuences the contributions of others. Sub-
stantial theoretical and experimental literature has shown that ﬁrst
movers can affect voluntary contributions in sequential decision
settings through free-riding (Varian, 1994), information signaling
(Hermalin, 1998, 2007; Vesterlund, 2003; Potters et al., 2005, 2007;
Andreoni, 2006), reciprocity (Andreoni et al., 2002; Meidinger and
Villeval, 2003; Gächter et al., 2010, 2012) and social status (Kumru
and Vesterlund, 2010; Eckel et al., 2010). Due perhaps to the challenge
of empirical identiﬁcation of leadership inﬂuence in ﬁeld settings, no
study has examined how the example set by individuals who occupy
actual leadership positions affects the voluntary contributions of the
groups they lead. Our paper begins to ﬁll this gap in the literature by
conducting a randomized ﬁeld experiment in rural Bolivia that investi-
gates two questions: (1) Can local leaders (authorities) affect voluntary
public good provision through their example?, and (2) If so, why? Our
experiment examines the effect of leadership on the contributions of
both leaders and followers, and provides suggestive evidence on causal
mechanisms underlying leadership inﬂuence.the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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ically independent communities, each of which has its own elected local
authority.3 In our experiment, a representative sample of community
members pool resources to provide environmental education books
for the local school.4 We employ a between-subject design that solicits
voluntary contributions in a natural decision setting and compare total
contributions when an authority makes an initial public voluntary con-
tribution – and other groupmembers make private voluntary contribu-
tions after observing the authority's choice – to two types of controls:
one in which a randomly selected community member makes an initial
public contribution and one in which all contributions are private. Two
of the three treatments are implemented simultaneously in each com-
munity, facilitating the use of ﬁxed effects to address unobservable
community-level confounds.
Our results show that local authorities increase average contribu-
tions when they lead by example. The effect is unique to authorities;
randomly selected individuals have little effect on overall giving when
they lead. We decompose treatment effects into leader and follower re-
sponses to leadership. Our results show that authorities not only in-
crease their own contributions when they lead by example, they also
inﬂuence follower contributions. Followers of authorities aremore like-
ly to make a low contribution after observing a low leader contribution
andmore likely tomake a high contribution after observing a high lead-
er contribution, relative to contributions in the simultaneous setting.
Follower contributions are less strongly inﬂuenced by the contributions
of randomly selected leaders.
We offer two pieces of suggestive evidence on why leaders affect
public good provision in our setting. First, our study is designed to iden-
tify information signaling as a mechanism through which leaders
inﬂuence followers. We exogenously vary whether or not participants
receive information about the quality of the public good. Uninformed
participants are more responsive than informed participants to the ex-
ample set by community authorities, but even informed followers ad-
just their contributions in the direction of the leader's contribution
when the authority sets the example. This result suggests that other
mechanisms such as social status or reciprocity contribute to the ob-
served inﬂuence of authority leaders. Second, we examine the relative
importance of the authority's formal leadership position in the commu-
nity and his or her observable characteristics. In our study, community
members randomly selected to lead by example who more closely re-
semble local authorities have a greater inﬂuence over the contribution
decisions of followers, i.e. they have the same effect on provision as do
authorities in a leadership role. This ﬁnding provides suggestive evi-
dence that authorities are inﬂuential because of their characteristics,
not just the formal position they hold.
Our study is the ﬁrst to examine how local authorities affect volun-
tary public good provision without the use of sanctions or coercion
and thus makes several contributions to the literature. First, we empir-
ically identify leadership by example as a mechanism through which
local authorities can affect real voluntary contributions in a develop-
ment setting. Second, we show that the leadership inﬂuence of local au-
thorities on aggregate provision is explained both by their own
contribution and the effect that they have on the contribution decisions
of others. Third, we offer novel evidence on one of the most studied
channels underlying leadership by example – information signaling –
and show that its empirical relevance depends on who is in the leader-
ship role. Finally,we provide suggestive evidence that authorities are in-
ﬂuential because of their formal position in the community, their3 We refer to the elected local leader as the “authority” to differentiate the leadership
role assigned in the experiment from the formal authority position elected local leaders
occupy at the community level.
4 Environmental education books provided through the experiment are accessible to all
community members (non-excludable), but exhibit rivalry. Because contributions exert a
positive externality that is non-rival and non-excludable on anyone who cares about the
provision of education material in the local school, we consider them a pure public good
from the donor's perspective.elevated contributions when placed in a leadership role, and their ob-
servable characteristics; traits such as education and wealth, which
are correlatedwith several potentialmechanisms of authority inﬂuence,
matter.
Our study relates to a small but growing number of controlled ﬁeld
studies that examine the relationship between leaders and public
good contributions in developing countries. Using public good games
in the ﬁeld, Grossman and Baldassarri (2012) ﬁnd that individuals
elected within the experiment – who are not local authorities – are
more effective at sanctioning low voluntary contributions, while
Beekman et al. (2014) show that voluntary contributions are lower
in communities that have corrupt ofﬁcials. Kosfeld and Rustagi
(forthcoming) study how the sanctioning style of leaders, elicited
through a third party punishment game, is correlated with local forest
conservation outcomes. More similar to our study, d'Adda (2012)
conducts an artefactual ﬁeld experiment in 8 villages in rural
Colombia that investigates how social information interacts with so-
cial status, deﬁned endogenously along leadership dimensions, in a
repeated voluntary contribution setting. Her results show that high
status individuals (leaders elected within the experiment) are
more likely to make high contributions and are less inﬂuenced by
the contribution decisions of others. Our study is unique in this liter-
ature in that we study actual authorities, vary leadership exogenous-
ly, use a one-shot decision setting in which both leaders and
followers can react to leadership, and study voluntary contributions
to an actual good that beneﬁts the community.
In trading off the control of the laboratory for the richness of the
ﬁeld, our study makes some compromises. First, in order to investigate
both leader and follower responses to leadership, we allow leader con-
tributions to arise endogenously in our experiment. This design feature
reveals whether or not authorities take advantage of leadership oppor-
tunities, but prevents us from cleanly separating the effect of leader con-
tributions from leader characteristics and leader type when analyzing
follower responses. Second, a small number of communities could not
comply with treatment randomization for idiosyncratic reasons. Our
ﬁndings are robust to correcting for any resulting selection bias. Third,
like most ﬁeld studies, our results are speciﬁc to a particular setting at
a particular point in time. While Bolivia's unique decentralized local
governance arrangement allows us to examine the effect of local au-
thorities on voluntary public good provision, other types of leaders
may be more inﬂuential in other contexts. The fact that we ﬁnd sugges-
tive evidence that leadership by example operates through multiple
channels increases the likelihood that our results are relevant to other
settings where different types of opinion leaders exist and where one
or more channels of leadership inﬂuence are relevant.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 offers a conceptual frame-
work for leadership in voluntary contributions. Section 3 describes the
experimental context and design. Section 4 describes the main results,
treatment heterogeneities, and robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
2. Conceptual framework
Early theoretical literature on sequential giving showed that leader-
ship by example is weakly detrimental for voluntary public good provi-
sion when information is perfect and individuals are solely motivated
by altruism (Varian, 1994). This result emerges because the positive ex-
ternalities generated by voluntary contributions introduce a free-riding
incentive that induces ﬁrst movers, leaders, to make low initial contri-
butions that force followers to provide the public good. Subsequent
theoretical and experimental studies have, in contrast, shown that se-
quential giving can be beneﬁcial for public good provision. Three primary
classes of mechanisms underlie these positive results: (1) information
signaling, (2) reciprocity, and (3) social status.
First, models of information signaling have shown that sequential
giving can have beneﬁcial effects for voluntary public good provision
when the common value of the public good is uncertain. If the leader
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public good is of high (low) value by making a high (low) contribution
that induces others to follow (Hermalin, 1998, 2007; Vesterlund, 2003;
Potters et al., 2005; Andreoni, 2006).5 Although level predictions
are conditional on the information that the leader possesses, informa-
tion signaling is always welfare enhancing in this setting. In our ﬁeld
setting, authorities may have superior information about the value of
the public good. They may have been elected precisely because of this
informational advantage, or may have acquired information through
their formal leadership role.6 If individuals have independent private
valuations for the public good that are not common knowledge, then
strategic uncertainty limits free-riding and leadership by example can
also increase public good provision (Bag and Roy, 2011).
Second, sequential giving can positively affect public good provision
when individuals have reciprocity, equity and/or fairness concerns
(Meidinger and Villeval, 2003; Huck and Rey-Biel, 2006; Potters et al.,
2005; Potters et al., 2007; Gächter et al., 2012). Leaders who make
high contributions crowd-in the contributions of others. They cannot
use their ﬁrstmover advantage to free-ride (as in Varian, 1994) because
reciprocal followers punish free-riding at a cost.7 In our ﬁeld setting, au-
thorities may generate more reciprocity among community members
due to their authority position. They may also cause a reduction in stra-
tegic uncertainty when coordination incentives are present, generated
by reciprocity and/or fairness concerns (Bicchieri, 2005).
Third, social status can affect public good provisionwhen individuals
with high social status lead and followers like to be associatedwith high
status others (Kumru and Vesterlund, 2010) or want to acquire status
themselves (Bracha et al., 2009).8 Status can also be modeled as the lo-
cation individuals occupy in a social network (center vs. periphery), and
explain leadership inﬂuence on voluntary contribution decisions
through the number of agents that observe the leader's choice (Eckel
et al., 2010). In a ﬁeld setting, authorities may have higher social status
than the average communitymember because they are wealthier, more
educated, and even possess higher social status as a direct result of the
formal leadership position they occupy in the community. Observable
characteristics associated with status may therefore provide a clue as
to the importance of status in the ﬁeld.
Any or all of the mechanisms described above may be active when
any individual leads by example. Their importance, however, may be
ampliﬁedwhen a local authority leads. To empirically test this assertion
we conduct an experiment that varies whether or not a local authority
or a random individual leads by example. Using the private, simulta-
neous contribution setting as the benchmark for comparison, we test
whether Varian's (1994) free-riding predictions hold. We do not devel-
op a theoretical model capable of providing speciﬁc predictions by lead-
er type andmechanismbecause the variety of channels described in this5 Field studies have investigated information signaling within the context of charitable
contributions. For example, Karlan and List (2012) examine information signaling within
the context ofmatching grants in charitable giving, while Smith et al. (forthcoming) inves-
tigate peer effects in charity fundraising conducted by individuals on-line. The form of
leadership we study differs from these ﬁeld studies in that we require the leaders to set
an example by making a one-time costly and unrecoverable contribution before others;
the leader does not observe the decisions of others and cannotmake contributions at a lat-
er time.
6 Miller and Mobarak (forthcoming) study this informational channel of leadership in-
ﬂuencewithin the context of opinion leader inﬂuence on technology adoption decisions in
Bangladesh. They show that when opinion leaders (including local authorities) unani-
mously decide to accept (reject) the adoption of a new technology, the likelihood of adop-
tion by other community members increases (decreases).
7 Andreoni et al. (2002) andGächter et al. (2010) compare simultaneous and sequential
giving in linear public good games in the laboratorywhen information is perfect and show
that although leaders try to free-ride off of followers, followers punish free-riding by giv-
ing less than their best response function predicts.
8 Related to this literature is also the empirical work on prestige and visibility motives
for giving. See, for example, Harbaugh (1998), Ariely et al. (2009) and Karlan and
McConnell (2014).sectionmay coexist simultaneously in our study setting.9We rely on the
existing literature to provide intuition as to howeachmechanismworks
and focus instead on testing for the ﬁrst time how leadership by exam-
ple affects voluntary public good provision in a ﬁeld settingwhen actual
leaders take on a leadership role.
2.1. Hypotheses
Our study is designed to test four groups of benchmark hypotheses
derived after the pure altruism model of voluntary public good provi-
sion (Varian, 1994). Rejection of the null hypotheses is consistent
with all channels underlying positive leadership by example effects
(information signaling, reciprocity, and social status). Hypothesis 4 is
the exception, which refers speciﬁcally to information signaling. We
generate the variation necessary to test Hypothesis 4 by randomizing
access to information about the public good among followers in our ex-
perimental set up, which is described in greater detail in Section 3.
Hypothesis 1. Leadership by example (sequential giving) weakly de-
creases total contributions relative to the simultaneous contribution
setting.
Null Hypothesis 1 establishes the main result of Varian (1994): se-
quential giving is weakly detrimental for public good provision because
of free-riding. The alternative hypothesis is that sequential giving in-
creases total contributions relative to the simultaneous contribution
setting, particularly when authorities give ﬁrst. This is consistent with
any or all of the underlying mechanisms discussed in this section.
Free-riding incentives need not be absent, only outweighed by the
other mechanisms.
Hypothesis 2. Individuals give less when they lead by example (give
publicly before others), than when they give in a private simultaneous
setting.
Null Hypothesis 2 predicts that contribution leaders (ﬁrst movers)
free-ride off of followers. The alternative hypothesis is that individuals
make higher contributions when they give publicly before others than
when they give in a private simultaneous setting. Speciﬁcally, we expect
authority contribution leaders to give more than randomly selected
contribution leaders both because they recognize the positive inﬂuence
that they can exert on others and becausemore of themechanisms that
make contribution leaders inﬂuential may be relevant when a local au-
thority leads.
Hypothesis 3. Follower contributions are decreasing in the contribu-
tionsmade by contribution leaders. They decrease (increase) with lead-
ership by example, relative to the simultaneous contribution setting,
when leader contributions increase (decrease).
Null Hypothesis 3 establishes free-riding. The alternative to
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the best response function of followers is
ﬂat or upward sloping. We expect followers to positively respond to
the contributions made by ﬁrst movers, and more so to the contribu-
tions made by authorities, because authorities likely amplify the mech-
anisms that underlie positive leadership by example effects.
Hypothesis 4. Information does not affect follower response to ﬁrst
mover contributions.
Null Hypothesis 4 establishes the straw man hypothesis that leader
contributions do not convey information. The alternative is that leader9 Deriving speciﬁc predictions from a model that incorporates all mechanisms of lead-
ership inﬂuence and distinguishes between different types of leaders requires strong as-
sumptions about preferences and about leader characteristics, and is made complex by
themultiplicity of different channels at work in our setting. Our experimental design does
not generate the variation necessary to distinguish between mechanisms, so including
such a model would do little to aid in the interpretation of our results.
11 All community members can access the education material available in the local
school. Teachers are present in the school during the week and can grant school access.
Community authorities and members of the parent–teacher association also have keys
to the school.
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sive to the example set by contribution leaders the more information
they possess about the public good.
3. Experimental design
We employ a between-subject design with three treatments that
(a) identiﬁes the effect authorities have on voluntary public good provi-
sion when they lead by example, (b) distinguishes the inﬂuence of
authorities from that of non-authorities in the community, and
(c) incorporates additional variation to explore the importance of one
of the most studied mechanisms behind leadership by example: infor-
mation signaling. Before turning to the design of the experiment and
its implementation, we describe the study setting, which informs our
design.
3.1. Study setting
The experimentwas conducted in 52 communities located in the Rio
Grande–Valles Cruceños region of Bolivia, in collaboration with a non-
governmental organization, Fundación Natura. The setting is useful for
the study of leadership by example in public good provision for three
reasons. First, decentralization in Bolivia extends all the way to local
level administrative units called Organizaciones Territoriales de Base
(OTBs). OTBs are independent social and political units; in our study set-
ting they are small in size (the average OTB contains 27 households),
meet regularly as a group, and are poorly integrated with outside mar-
kets. Each OTB has an elected representative (OTB president) who
serves as the formal authority in the community. OTB presidents are
elected in public meetings through majority vote. There is no clear
term limit but most remain in ofﬁce for a couple of years. The position
is unpaid. OTB presidents are in charge of requesting funds from the
municipal government, of developing local projects, of interacting
with outsiders, and of organizing collectivework. The fact that these au-
thorities exist in all communities allows us to use a single, pre-existing
deﬁnition of local leader, rather than relying on subjective approaches
thatmight vary from community to community. Although other leader-
ship positions exist in the OTB, including vice president, treasurer, and
secretary, none has the same level of importance as the OTB president.
We use the term OTB interchangeably with community in the remain-
der of the paper because there is perfect overlap between OTBs and
communities in our sample.
Second, political parties and organizations have little presence in the
study area.10 Anecdotal evidence indicates that OTB presidents do not
actively seek ofﬁce and have no intention of pursuing a political career.
They accept the authority positionwhen selected by their peers, but ﬁnd
the responsibility costly in terms of the effort and time. This helps mit-
igate political factors that might confound our experimental design, but
may also increase the likelihood of observing leadership by example ef-
fects in our setting. Given the paucity of ﬁeld evidence on the topic, we
consider this to be an advantage.
Third, a detailed census of 130 communities was conducted in the
area by Fundación Natura in 2010. The census includes information
that facilitated the randomization of communities and households into
treatments, and provides us with most of the controls used in our anal-
ysis of experimental results. Study communities are spread over ﬁve
municipalities across a very rural 7400 km2 area. Though the study
area is culturally and socioeconomically fairly homogenous, some com-
munities are considerably more remote than others.
The experimental design uses a naturally occurring decision setting –
a community meeting – to solicit contributions to environmental10 Sixty percent of households in our study (located in 51 communities) indicated in the
2010 census that political syndicates do not exist at the OTB level. Six out of 41 local au-
thorities indicated that they attend political syndicate meetings, but none indicated that
they have occupied authority positions at the syndicate level in the past.education books for the local school. Communitymeetings occur regular-
ly in our study setting, and are organized through local authorities to ad-
dress community business or at the request of outside individuals or
organizations. We followed the standard local practices that community
outsiders employ to organize meetings, to make the decision setting as
natural as possible.
Environmental education books were chosen as the public good in
our experiment for several reasons. First, all communities in our study
have a local primary school, to which books could be donated. Second,
40% of households in our study site identiﬁed environmental protection
as one of the top values that should be taught to children. All communi-
ties are located inside a watershed that was declared protected in 2007.
Environmental issues such as trash,water pollution, and soil erosion are
thus very salient in the area. Third, although environmental education
books are not a pure public good, they exhibit several relevant charac-
teristics: books are non-excludable and generate social spillovers.11
We consider themapure public good from thedonor's perspective. Spe-
ciﬁcally, donations generate a positive externality that is non-rival and
non-excludable on anyone who cares about the provision of education
material in the local school.12
From a practical perspective, books made it possible for us to exam-
ine voluntary contributions to a local public good in a setting in which
even small contributions could ensure positive levels of provision.
They also minimized trust confounds by allowing us to deliver the
good acquired by the contributions at the end of the experiment.
The books used in the experiment were purchased from a non-
government organization that specializes in producing environmental
education material in Bolivia. Seven different books were available,
and were sold at a zero-proﬁt price of 10 Bs. per book.
3.2. Treatments
Our experiment employs a between-subject designwith three treat-
ments. In each treatment, subjects complete a survey in exchange for
money and are subsequently given the opportunity tomake a voluntary
contribution to environmental education books for the local school.
The treatments vary the way in which community members make
voluntary contribution decisions. In a No Leader Treatment (NL), indi-
viduals make private simultaneous contributions. In a Random Leader
Treatment (RL), a randomly selected individual is asked to make his or
her voluntary contribution publicly before others. In an Authority Lead-
er Treatment (AL), the community authority (OTB president) is asked to
make his or her voluntary contribution publicly ﬁrst. We refer to these
ﬁrst movers as contribution leaders. In both the RL and AL treatments,
other participants make private voluntary contribution decisions after
observing the contribution leader's public choice. The sequential deci-
sion settingwe employ follows the laboratory literature,which typically
uses a 2-person public good game with induced preferences to study
leadership by example (see, for example, Potters et al., 2005, 2007;
Kumru and Vesterlund, 2010; Gächter et al., 2010). Our experiment
uses the same setup, in which an exogenously chosen ﬁrst mover
makes a public contribution decision, but with a group of size n. While
it does notmake a differencewhether follower contributions are private
or public in the 2-person game employed in the laboratory, follower
contributions are private in our experiment to provide a test of leader-
ship by example that is clean of sequential considerations introduced
by public follower contributions.12 Focus groupswere conducted at thepilot stage in communities close to but not includ-
ed our study sample to select the public good used in the experiment and to assess its per-
ceived quality. Qualitative evidence gathered at the pilot stage showed that most
participants perceived the books to be of high quality, address an important topic, and ap-
peal to children.
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control in our experiment. Comparison of NL and AL determines if local
authorities affect voluntary public good provision through their exam-
ple. Comparison of RL and AL determines whether AL treatment effects
are speciﬁc to authority leaders or are a generic response to leadership.
We conduct two simultaneous treatments per community and use
ﬁxed effects to control for community characteristics that may affect
both leader and follower contributions. Whenever AL is conducted in
a community, the authority is assigned to the AL treatment. Whenever
the AL treatment is not conducted in a community, the authority is
assigned to the NL treatment. No authority is thus ever present in the
RL treatment.
The design introduces an information manipulation in all treatments
that gives half of all participants, and always the contribution leader, the
opportunity to inspect the public good before making a voluntary con-
tribution decision.13 If the leader's contribution conveys information
about the value or quality of the public good then uninformed follower
contributions should move in the direction of the leader's contribution
(Vesterlund, 2003; Potters et al., 2005, 2007; Andreoni, 2006).While vi-
sual inspection may not resolve all uncertainty about the quality of the
public good, the effect of the leader's contribution should be muted or
reversed for informed followers, who rely less on the leader's contribu-
tion to update their beliefs about thequality of the public good. Compar-
ison of uninformed and informed follower decisions within treatment
isolates the effect of information signaling. Comparison across treat-
ments informs us about its differential importance by contribution
leader type.
3.3. Implementation
Table 1 summarizes the stages of implementation and refers the
reader to the relevant Appendix section where the translated (English
language) script is provided. Data collection and study implementation
occurred over several stages, beginning with a census of the region im-
plemented by the study partner in 2010. OTBs included in the census
but missing OTB-level information or without a local primary school
were excluded from our study, as were communities smaller than 15
or greater than 80 households in size. The ﬁnal eligible sample consisted
of 52 OTBs.
OTBswere randomly assigned to oneof three possible pairwise com-
binations of the NL, RL and AL treatments and 12 households from each
community were randomly sampled for participation, using the min
max T procedure (Bruhn and McKenzie, 2009) and testing balance on
bothOTB andhousehold variables from the 2010 census.14 The random-
ization thus delivered both balanced characteristics across treatment
and a representative sample of households for participation in the
study.
The implementation of the experiment began with a visit by the
study team to each community 4 to 7 days prior to the intervention.
The team met with community leaders, scheduled the community
meeting, and delivered invitations worded to minimize experimenter
demand effects that might arise if the meeting was organized by the13 The information manipulation is implemented in such a way that informed agents
know who else is able to inspect the public good, but uninformed agents have no knowl-
edge of the informational advantage possessed by others.
14 Randomization was balanced at the household level on: the number of rooms in a
house, the education of the household head, the number of children under 16 per house-
hold, a stated preference for instilling environmental values in children, perceptions of
community cooperation and decision-making, attitudes toward outsiders and participa-
tion in past community meetings. The distance to market, the number of households in
the community, and the municipality were all balanced at the community level. Most
balancing variables are included as controls. In the analysis, a few variables are replaced
with superior measures of the underlying characteristic of interest, such as the use of
household assets measured by the raw sum of durables owned by the household instead
of number of rooms as a proxy for wealth. Analysis that includes households that did not
participate in the experiment relies exclusively on the balance variables.partner NGO (see Appendices B.1 through B.3). Speciﬁcally, written in-
vitationswere delivered in person to the heads of the 12 households se-
lected through the randomization process, which always included the
OTB president. At the time of invitation, individuals were told that
they could earn up to 45 Bs. for attending the meeting and that only
one person per household could attend.15 On the day of the experiment,
invited householdswere reminded of the time and location of themeet-
ing (see Appendix B.4). At all stages of the invitation process, unavail-
able households were replaced using a list of alternates generated
through the original randomization.16
Two types of attrition affect the ﬁnal study sample. The ﬁrst is selec-
tion into the study, which occurred before the experimental session
was conducted and does not affect the internal validity of our results.
Appendix Table A.1 provides a description of how the sample of house-
holds selected through randomization differs from the ﬁnal sample of
participants. The second is selection into treatment, which occurred in
6 sessions assigned to the AL treatment, where the authority was not
present on the day of the experiment. These sessions were run with ei-
ther the NL or RL treatment (whichever was not assigned to the other
concurrent session in the same community). In four cases, to preserve
balance in the number of sessions across treatments, the next available
community scheduled to receive a combination of RL andNL treatments
received an unplanned AL treatment. These incidents are documented
in Appendix Table A.2.
Selection into treatment is potentially problematic for our empirical
strategy. Authority absences, however, appear to have been idiosyncrat-
ic. Authorities were not present the day of the experiment because they
had to attend classes in themunicipal capital, had to take care ofmedical
emergencies, or were away harvesting crops. No systematic differences
between sessions selected into and out of treatment are detected in our
data (see Appendix Table A.2). We show balance on the characteristics
of participants for the ﬁnal experimental sample in Appendix
Table A.3. The AL treatment has fewer females, and participants in the
NL treatment have slightly fewer assets, measured as a raw sum of du-
rables owned by the household. These results persist when community
ﬁxed effects are included and are partly driven by the fact that authori-
ties differ from other community members on a number of observable
characteristics (described in Appendix Table A.4), and are more often
present in the AL treatment. We control for these and other observable
characteristics throughout our analysis of experimental results.
Each experimental session consisted of three parts and took place at
the local school or in another centrally located community building.
Throughout the implementation, efforts weremade to keep the process
similar to a typical community meeting. Appendix B.5 provides the
script used to conduct the session.
In Part 1 of the meeting, individuals arrived to the designated meet-
ing place, registered, received an envelope, an ID number, and consent
forms. IDs ranging from 0 to 11 were distributed at random to partici-
pants with the exception of ID 0, which was always given to the OTB
authority. The subject that was randomly assigned ID 6 acted as contri-
bution leader in the RL treatment. Subjects with ID 0 and 6 were not
aware that theywould have a special role in the experiment. All subjects
were informed that they would earn 35 Bs. by completing a question-
naire and 10 Bs. by attending the full meeting. At the time of soliciting
consent, subjects knew that they would be asked survey questions but
were not aware that theywould be asked tomake a voluntary contribu-
tion. Part 1 of the experiment took approximately 20 min.
In Part 2, subjects were split into two groups based on their ID num-
ber, which allowedmore seating space for each of the participantswhile
also facilitating the implementation of two simultaneous treatments.
The experimenter and assistant were rotated to ensure balance across15 45 Bs. is approximately 6.50 US dollars and is equal to the daily wage for agricultural
work in the study setting.
16 In select cases, no alternates from the list were available and substitutionswere based
on convenience. Convenience replacements were made in 19 cases.
Table 1
Study implementation timeline.
Step Timing relative to session Stage Details Supporting documentation
1 1 year before Census Census of 120 communities (N3000 households) conducted by NGO partner as
part of a long run project conducted in the area.
2 1 to 3 months before Randomization Random sample of households selected using census data and pairwise
combination of treatments assigned to communities.
3 1 week before Invitation Community meeting organized in each OTB with the approval of OTB
representatives. Sampled households delivered invitations to attend a
community meeting. Appointment made with school teacher to conduct a
survey the day of the intervention.
Appendices B.l, B.2, B.3
4 Day of Reminder Invited households reminded about the time and location of the community
meeting. When an invited household was unable to attend an alternative
household selected through randomization procedures was invited to
participate in the study.
Appendix B.4
5 Day of Session Community meeting, including substages (single script) Appendix B.5
1. Registration Participants arrive at the community meeting, receive an identiﬁcation number,
and give consent to participate in the study.
2. Session split Meeting randomly split into two sessions using even and odd identiﬁcation
numbers.
3. Questionnaire Participants in each session complete a 17 question survey in exchange for 35 Bs. Appendix C.l
4. Questionnaire payment Payment of 35 Bs. given to participants who complete the survey, in 7 units of
5 Bs. coins.
5. Information manipulation Participants with even ID numbers are asked to step outside of the room and are
given the opportunity to inspect environmental education books.
6. Contribution decisions Participants are given the opportunity to make voluntary contributions to
acquire environmental education books for the local school.
7. Post-decision questionnaire 6 question survey administered to participants after all donations are made. Appendix C.2
8. Delivery of show up fee 10 Bs. show up fee given to all participants in an envelope.
9. Reconvene Participants are taken back to a single room, where the community meeting is
reconvened.
10. Delivery of books The total amount contributed by participants in both sessions is announced and
the corresponding number of books is delivered publicly.
11. Conclusion Participants leave the room.
6 Day of Teacher survey Survey administered to a teacher who preferably did not participate in the
meeting or had a household member participate.
Appendix C.3
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tions unrelated to the study (see Appendix C.1), in exchange for their
experimental earnings. Questions were read out loud to participants,
who answered using paper and pencil.
Regardless of the answers provided, all subjects were given 35 Bs. in
5 Bs. coins upon completion of the survey. Participants with even ID
numbers were then asked to step out of the room; contribution leaders
always had even ID numbers. Even numbered subjects were shown the
environmental education books and given the opportunity to inspect
them, but were not told how the books would be used in the session.
Subjects with odd ID numbers were not told the purpose of this inter-
ruption, and were asked to answer one additional survey question to
pass the time.17 Participants with even IDs returned to the room after
5 min.
Following the information manipulation, the contribution decision
was presented to subjects. Subjects were told that the money earned
by completing the survey was theirs to keep and that they could con-
tribute as much or as little as they wanted to the environmental educa-
tion books for the local school. Books were displayed in front of the
room and subjects were given general information about their cost
and content. They were informed that for every 10 Bs. contributed by
all communitymembers (in both sessions of the experiment) the school
would receive one book.18 Participants knew that 7 different volumes of17 Subjects with odd ID numbers observed those with even numbered IDs leave the
room, but none asked about the purpose of the interruption and no explicit explanation
was provided. Given that the subjects had already been split into two groups based on
ID number, further amendments to the group structure based on ID numbermay not have
been surprising at this stage of the implementation.
18 Participantswere additionally informed that contributionswould be rounded up if the
total amount contributed by all participantswas not amultiple of 10. This ensured that we
never kept any of the contributions made by subjects.the bookswere available and that theywould be delivered on-site at the
end of the experiment.
To make their voluntary contributions, subjects were asked to place
the money they wished to contribute in an envelope that had their ID
number marked on the inside. Contribution decisions were done in pri-
vate behind a cardboard partition. If the session was assigned the RL or
the AL treatment, the contribution leader – referred to by his or her ID
number –was asked to publicly announce the amount of his or her con-
tribution as it was placed in the envelope. All other participants were
called one by one to make their private voluntary contribution in the
back of the room behind the cardboard partition. Complete conﬁdenti-
ality was stressed to ensure that subjects would not be concerned
about sanctioning or other social rewards or punishment. The order
by which subjects were called upon to make their contributions
depended on the seating arrangement. Participants were not allowed
to talk while contribution decisions were being made.
After all participants made their contributions, subjects were
asked to complete a survey with 6 questions on household socio-
demographics and perceptions of teaching quality in the local school
(see Appendix C.2). The purpose of these questions was to collect
individual-level information that was not available through the census
or was outdated.19 Once the ﬁnal survey was completed, subjects re-
ceived a 10 Bs. show up fee. This marked the conclusion of Part 2,
which took approximately 60 min.
Part 3 of the experiment started once both experimental sessions
were over. All participants returned to the same room and the total
amount contributed by subjects was announced. The environmental19 Note that the census occurred one year prior to the experiment. We chose not to re-
collect substantial socio-demographic information to avoid imposing an additional time
burden on participants, and chose to gather data on key time-varying questions that were

































86 B.K. Jack, M.P. Recalde / Journal of Public Economics 122 (2015) 80–93education books were counted in public and given to the community
authority or school representative in front of all subjects. The ﬁnal part
of the experiment took approximately 10 min. The entire session lasted
between 90 and 120 min.
4. Results
We observe the decisions of 580 subjects in 104 sessions of the
experiment, which were conducted between May and July 2011.
Each session included between 4 and 6 subjects; a total of 9 to 12 in-
dividuals participated in the experiment in each of the 52 communi-
ties included in our sample. Table 2 summarizes these and other
session characteristics, our primary outcome variables, and the set
of variables that we use as controls throughout the analysis. We con-
trol for a number of factors that may affect contributions both of
leaders and of followers, including past leadership roles in the OTB,
whether the individual is a teacher (12% of OTB presidents are also
teachers), the number of children in the individual's household
that attend the local school, and whether the individual was exposed
to the information manipulation.
We begin by describing the raw contribution data before outlining
our empirical strategy. Fig. 1 showshistograms of contributiondecisionsTable 2
Summary statistics.
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcome variables
Contribution 8.236 5.830 0 40 580
Contribution N 0 Bs. 0.472 0.500 0 1 580
Contribution ≥ 10 Bs. 0.941 0.235 0 1 580
Total contributions 45.930 16.500 10 120 104
Contribution: NL treatment 7.767 6.117 0 35 188
Contribution: RL treatment 7.960 5.106 0 35 201
Contribution: AL treatment 8.987 6.202 0 40 191
Contribution: leaders, RL 10.556 4.595 5 20 36
Contribution: leaders, AL 14.279 8.344 5 40 34
Contribution: followers, RL 7.394 5.048 0 35 165
Contribution: followers, AL 7.841 4.969 0 35 157
Control variables
Individual received information 0.529 0.500 0 1 580
Female 0.291 0.455 0 1 580
Years of education 4.733 3.489 0 20 580
Household assets (sum of durables) 1.972 1.551 0 9 580
Num. children attending local school 0.640 1.074 0 10 580
Evaluated teacher as good or excellent 0.607 0.489 0 1 580
Caring for environment is top value 0.395 0.489 0 1 580
Participated in all OTB meetings 0.366 0.482 0 1 580
Participates in OTB projects 0.659 0.475 0 1 580
Always agrees with community decisions 0.672 0.470 0 1 580
Always trusts NGOs 0.407 0.492 0 1 580
Held past OTB leadership position 0.103 0.305 0 1 580
Teacher 0.038 0.191 0 1 580
Experimenter indicator 0.500 0.502 0 1 104
Session size 5.577 0.516 4 6 104
Share of session female 0.287 0.192 0 0.833 104
Other variables
Community size 26.803 13.042 15 75 52
Travel time to nearest market (min) 171.442 131.590 15 720 52
Pupils provide their own books 0.635 0.486 0 1 52
Notes: Variables are measured at the individual level unless otherwise noted. Contribu-
tions, experimenter indicator, session size, and share of session female are measured at
the session level. Community size, travel time to nearest market and pupils provide
their own books are measured at the community level. All variables listed under the con-









































Fig. 1. Histogram of contributions by participant type and treatment. Notes: Figures
represent histograms of contributions in bins of 5 Bs. Each of the ﬁgures describes contri-
butions for different samples of participants: all (top), contribution leaders only (middle)
and followers only (including the NL treatment, bottom). The shading describes each of
the three experimental treatments, and the histogram plots the share of each treatment
in the different contribution bins.by participant type and experimental treatment.20 Panel (a) combines
all participants and shows that 5 and 10 Bs. are the most common con-
tribution levels across treatments. A contribution of 5 Bs. is the median
contribution in the study population and the minimum non-zero20 Contributions are classiﬁed in 5 Bs. bins that reﬂect themonetary unit used to pay sub-
jects in the experiment. A small number of subjects made contributions using their own
coins. These are rounded to the closest 5 Bs. interval in Fig. 1 but not in the remainder of
the analysis.
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tion that has a direct impact on the provision of environmental educa-
tion books.21 The AL and RL treatments show a pattern of ﬁrst order
stochastic dominance over the NL treatment. Differences between the
AL and RL treatments are statistically insigniﬁcant, but suggest that au-
thorities increase provision more than random individuals when they
lead by example.22 Panels (b) and (c) break contributions down by par-
ticipant type. This presentation of raw data suggests that authority
leaders give more than individuals randomly selected to lead by exam-
ple (Panel b), and that contribution leaders make higher contributions
than followers (Panel b vs. c).23
Although the raw data suggests that contributions increase with
leadership by example, these results ignore observable and unobserv-
able factors that drive both leader and follower contributions. To quan-
tify treatment effects parametrically we regress contributions on the
experimental treatments and include communityﬁxed effects. Commu-
nity ﬁxed effects remove any spurious correlation between leader and
follower giving, driven by unobservable community-level factors. Even
with ﬁxed effects, we include the individual- and session-level controls
deﬁned in Table 2, to address the slight imbalance of observable charac-
teristics discussed in Section 3.
We estimate treatment effects using three different speciﬁcations,
which we describe in general here and in detail immediately preceding
each set of results. First, to examine effects on average contributions,
we use a continuous measure of contributions and estimate treatment
effects using ordinary least squares. Second, we take into account that
the experiment was implemented using 5 Bs. coins and use an ordered
logit model in which each 5 Bs. interval constitutes a separate categor-
ical giving bin.24 Third, given that the greatest mass of contributions
occurs at 5 and 10 Bs. (see Fig. 1) treatment effects may be concentrat-
ed around the median level of giving. We therefore estimate treatment
effects on the probability of giving above the median (≥10 Bs). We
revert to OLS for the median regressions, though our results are
qualitatively similar if we use a conditional logit model with ﬁxed ef-
fects. All tables show OLS and ordered logit estimates, include ﬁxed ef-
fects, and show results with and without controls. In our discussion of
the results, we describe point estimates from the speciﬁcations with
controls.
In our main analyses, we assume that the selection documented in
the implementation section is idiosyncratic. Robustness checks that
address selection into treatment, including an instrumental variable
correction and a sample restriction to the compliant sub-sample of com-
munities, are presented in Section 3. They are consistent with our main
results.21 Note that there are two possible focal points for contributions in our study: 10 Bs., the
minimum individual contribution that changes the supply of the public good directly, and
70 Bs., the aggregate contribution level that supplies a full set of books. Ten Bs. is also the
value of the show-up fee. Themodal contribution of 5 Bs. in theNL treatment suggests that
neither focal point is particularly salient for participants, since it under-provides relative to
both.
22 Two-sided Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney rank sum tests reject the null hypothesis that
the contributions of all participants in AL and NL or RL and NL were drawn from the same
underlying distribution (p b 0.01 and p b 0.10 respectively). Differences between AL and
RL are not statistically signiﬁcant; though the two-sided Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney rank
sum test has a p-value b 0.15.
23 Two-sided Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney rank sum tests provide p-values b 0.05 and
b0.01 respectively.
24 To accommodate community-level ﬁxed effects in the ordered logit speciﬁcation, we
use Baetschmann et al.'s (2011) “blow up and cluster” (BUC) approach, which generates
dichotomous outcomes at each of k thresholds and estimates each binary outcome using
conditional maximum likelihood. The method relies on the restriction that the log odds
associated with each threshold is the same, but is shown to be robust to outcome catego-
ries with few observations. In our data, the dependent variable acquires values
k ∈ {0, 5, 10, 15, 20} when contributions fall respectively in (0, 5), (5, 10), (10, 15), (15,
20) and (20,40). Contributions of 20 Bs. or more are grouped together because few obser-
vations exceed the value of 20, and no random leadermakes contributions in excess of this
amount (see Fig. 1).4.1. Main results
We begin by analyzing the effect of leadership by example on total
and individual contributions, then split the analysis to focus on the be-
havior of leaders and on the response of followers.
4.1.1. Total contributions
To test Hypothesis 1, the weak negative effect of leadership by ex-
ample predicted by free-riding, we estimate:
yic ¼ α þ β1ALic þ β2RLic þ ΓXic þ ηc þ ϵic ð1Þ
where yic represents the contributionmade by individual i in communi-
ty c, AL denotes the Authority Leader treatment, RL the Random Leader
treatment, Xic is the vector of individual- and session-level controls, ηc is
a community ﬁxed effect, and ϵic is an error term clustered at the com-
munity level.
Results are shown in Table 3. Columns 1 and 2 show estimates ag-
gregated at the session level, where i indexes the experimental session
and Xic is a vector of average session-level characteristics. Having an
authority lead by example increases the total contributions in an exper-
imental session by 9.36 Bs. (s.e. 5.21), or approximately one environ-
mental education book (column 2). Columns 4 and 6 show that this
translates to an average individual-level increase of 1.03 Bs. (s.e. 0.71)
or a 0.48 (s.e. 0.28) increase in the log odds of contributing an additional
5 Bs. coin. The median regressions in Columns 7 and 8 indicate that
the likelihood that a contribution exceeds the median increases by
15% (s.e. 0.07) when a local authority gives ﬁrst (column 8). We can
thus comfortably reject the null hypothesis that leadership by example
weakly decreases total contributions when an authority gives ﬁrst.
What happens when a random community member leads by exam-
ple? As Table 3 shows community members randomly selected to lead
by example do not affect total or average contributions (columns 1
through 6). We are therefore unable to reject the null hypothesis that
leadership by example weakly decreases public good provision when
a random individual gives ﬁrst. Random leaders do, however, increase
the probability that contributions exceed the median by approximately
10% (s.e. 0.05, column 8). As shown by the p-value for a test of equal co-
efﬁcients, the RL and AL treatments are signiﬁcantly different from each
other in most speciﬁcations. Having established that authorities in-
crease total contributions when they lead by example, we turn next
to the analysis of why authorities increase public good provision —
whether the effect is driven by their own contributions, the contribu-
tions of followers or both.
4.1.2. Leader contributions
We next examine how authority and randomly selected contribu-
tion leaders adjust their behavior when leading by example. To
test the null hypothesis that contribution leaders contribute less
when they lead by example than when they give in a private simulta-
neous setting and use their ﬁrst mover advantage to free-ride
(Hypothesis 2), we restrict our analysis to contribution leaders in the
RL and AL treatments and to individuals in the NL treatment, which in-
cludes elected authorities. TheNLparticipants thus form a counterfactu-
al for leader behavior, when contribution decisions are private. We
regress contribution decisions on leadership treatment and authority
status as follows:
yic ¼ α þ δAuthorityic þ β1ALic þ β2RLic þ ΓXic þ ηc þ ϵic ð2Þ
where Authorityic indicates that individual i in community c is an elected
authority in the NL treatment, and all other variables use the same no-
tation described in Eq. (1). The coefﬁcient on Authorityic therefore cap-
tures any difference in the private contribution behavior of authorities
and other community members. The coefﬁcients β1 and β2 reﬂect the
change in contribution behavior displayed by random individuals and
Table 4
Leader contributions.
Continuous Ordered logit ≥10 Bs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private giving by an authority −0.921 −0.290 −0.005 0.416 0.006 0.014
(2.257) (1.987) (0.815) (0.776) (0.171) (0.155)
Public giving by a random leader (RL) 2.400⁎ 1.690 1.076⁎⁎⁎ 1.219⁎⁎⁎ 0.347⁎⁎⁎ 0.327⁎⁎⁎
(1.266) (1.379) (0.391) (0.460) (0.080) (0.095)
Public giving by an authority leader (AL) 7.192⁎⁎⁎ 5.851⁎⁎ 2.144⁎⁎ 1.481⁎ 0.424⁎⁎ 0.322⁎
(2.637) (2.482) (0.917) (0.890) (0.196) (0.187)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Dep. variable mean, NL 7.751 7.701 0.372
Tests (p-values)
Public giving RL = AL 0.098 0.141 0.244 0.774 0.706 0.978
Authority private = public 0.084 0.149 0.190 0.484 0.242 0.343
Notes: N = 258. The sample consists of individualswho led by example in theRL andAL treatments and all subject in theNL treatment. Authority refers OTBpresidents inNL. Columns 1–2
and 5–6 present OLS estimates of treatment effects on leader contributions. Columns 3 and 4 show log odds ratios from an ordered logit regression (see text for details). All regressions
include community ﬁxed effects and standard errors clustered at the OTB level. Controls refer to the full set of individual- and session-level controls shown in the balance table.
⁎ p b 0.10.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
25 The authority does not always make the ﬁrst (private) decision in the NL treatment.
Controlling for order effects or the presence of an authority does not impact the outcome
of either authority or non-authority contributions in the NL treatment.
Table 3
Total contributions (all participants).
Total Individual
Continuous Continuous Ordered logit ≥10 Bs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RL −0.941 −0.643 −0.183 −0.268 0.136 0.122 0.100⁎ 0.096⁎
(3.865) (4.600) (0.652) (0.663) (0.235) (0.252) (0.055) (0.054)
AL 6.952 9.361⁎ 1.257⁎ 1.029 0.607⁎⁎ 0.481⁎ 0.174⁎⁎ 0.149⁎⁎
(4.280) (5.215) (0.739) (0.710) (0.270) (0.278) (0.066) (0.066)
N 104 104 580 580 580 580 580 580
Test: RL = AL (p-value) 0.102 0.040 0.072 0.071 0.045 0.103 0.273 0.402
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dep. variable mean, NL 42.947 7.767 7.649 0.378
Notes: N = 104 in columns 1 and 2, N = 580 in columns 3–6. Columns 1 and 2 show OLS estimates of treatment effects on total session contributions. Columns 3–4 and 7–8 show OLS
estimates of treatment effects on individual contributions. Columns 5–6 show log odds ratios from an ordered logit regression (see text for details). All speciﬁcations include community
ﬁxed effects and standard errors clustered at the community level. Controls refer to the full set of individual- and session-level controls shown in the balance table.
⁎ p b 0.10.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
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authorities who give in private in the NL treatment. The regression is
analogous to a difference in difference set up that includes leadership
position and authority status, where β1 represents the total effect for
an authority in a contribution leadership role. The regression does not
describe differences in the contribution behavior of authorities within
community because community ﬁxed effects are used and authorities
can only be present in one of the two simultaneous sessions conducted
in each community (AL or NL, speciﬁcally).With this caveat inmind, the
test for Authority public versus private reported in the last row of
Table 4 tests whether average authority contributions are signiﬁcantly
different when they are made in public in the AL treatment from
when they are made in private in the NL treatment. In our design, like
in most ﬁeld settings, the contribution decisions that leaders make
may be shaped both by their anticipated effect on follower decisions
and by reputational considerations.
Table 4 shows that we can reject the null hypothesis of contribution
leader free-riding. Both authorities and non-authorities increase their
contributions in response to leadership by example. Authorities give
5.85 Bs. (s.e. 2.48)morewhen they leadby example than the average in-
dividual in the NL treatment (Columns 1 and 2). Randomly selected
contribution leaders, on the other hand, give an additional 1.69 Bs.
(s.e. 1.38). In all speciﬁcations, the coefﬁcient on AL (β1) is equal to orlarger inmagnitude than the coefﬁcient on RL (β2). Though standard er-
rors are large, the difference between authority and non-authority lead-
er contributions is marginally signiﬁcant in some speciﬁcations. There is
thus only weak evidence supporting the notion that authorities who
lead by example give more than non-authorities who do so. Neverthe-
less, in contrast with the null hypothesis of ﬁrst mover free-riding,
these results suggest that part of the total increase in public good provi-
sion in the AL treatment is explained by the direct effect of the contribu-
tion of authorities who give publicly before others.
Interestingly, the differences in authority and non-authority
contributions arise solely in response to leadership. The coefﬁcient on
the authority status indicator (δ) is small and imprecisely estimated, in-
dicating that authority contributions are not different from the contri-
butions of other community members when they contribute privately
in the NL treatment. The ﬁnal row of Table 4 shows that the difference
in authority contributions in public and in private is marginally signiﬁ-
cant in only some speciﬁcations. It is important to note that we only ob-
serve 8 authorities giving in the NL treatment, so the authority status
indicator variable is identiﬁed off a very small number of observations.25
Table 5
Follower contributions.
Continuous Ordered Logit ≥ 10 Bs. (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Random leader (RL) -0.388 -0.367 -0.896 -0.802 -0.441 -0.381 -0.086 -0.093
(2.411) (2.437) (0.834) (0.940) (0.470) (0.476) (0.100) (0.106)
Authority leader (AL) -0.010 0.315 -1.512⁎⁎⁎ -1.098 -1.113⁎⁎⁎ -1.064⁎⁎⁎ -0.208⁎⁎⁎ -0.181⁎⁎
(1.023) (1.185) (0.361) (0.895) (0.201) (0.393) (0.049) (0.083)
RL x leader contribution -0.027 -0.033
(0.238) (0.238)
AL x leader contribution 0.005 -0.020
(0.078) (0.084)
RL x leader contribution ≥ 10 Bs. 0.448 0.265 0.492 0.420 0.212⁎ 0.218⁎
(1.117) (1.164) (0.507) (0.506) (0.112) (0.115)
AL x leader contribution ≥ 10 Bs. 1.856⁎ 1.334 1.420⁎⁎⁎ 1.312⁎⁎ 0.372⁎⁎⁎ 0.329⁎⁎⁎
(0.968) (1.334) (0.374) (0.530) (0.085) (0.109)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dep. Variable mean, NL treatment 7.767 7.767 7.728 0.378
Total effects
RL + RL X leader contribution ≥ 10 Bs. -0.448 -0.537 0.051 0.039 0.126⁎⁎ 0.124⁎⁎
(0.791) (0.773) (0.269) (0.271) (0.062) (0.060)
AL + AL X leader contribution ≥ 10 Bs. 0.344 0.236 0.307 0.248 0.164⁎⁎ 0.148⁎⁎
(0.898) (0.906) (0.315) (0.332) (0.070) (0.070)
Tests (p-values)
RL=AL 0.891 0.806 0.501 0.827 0.188 0.277 0.279 0.539
RL x leader contrib. = AL x leader contrib. 0.912 0.964 0.420 0.606 0.177 0.263 0.284 0.525
RL total effect = AL total effect 0.489 0.475 0.450 0.531 0.619 0.753
Notes: N=510. Columns 1-4 and 7-8 showOLS estimates of treatment effects on follower contributions. Columns 5 and 6 show log odds ratios from an ordered logit regressionwith ﬁxed
effects (see text for a details). All speciﬁcations include community ﬁxed effects and standard errors clustered at the OTB level. Controls refer to the full set of individual- and session-level
controls shown in the balance table.
⁎ p b 0.10.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
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Now we turn to the behavior of followers to test whether
they respond negatively to the contribution decisions of leaders
(Hypothesis 3), andwhether the response differs by leader type.We ex-
clude contribution leaders from the analysis and compare the behavior
of followers in the RL and AL treatments to individuals who contribute
privately in NL. The estimating equation is:
yic ¼ α þ β1ALic þ β2RLic þ β3ALic  yALc þ β4RLic  yRLc þ ΓXic þ ηc þ ϵic
ð3Þ
where yic represents the contribution made by follower i in community
c, and ycT for T∈ {AL, RL} represents the contributionmade by the contri-
bution leader in treatment T. The effect of the different leader types can-
not be completely separated from the fact that leader type (RL or AL) is
correlated with leader contribution decisions and leader characteristics
(see Appendix Table A.4). Thus, treatment effects on followers should
be interpreted as the combined effect of leader type, leader characteris-
tics, and endogenous leader contributions.26
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 showOLS estimates of Eq. (3)with a con-
tinuous measure of ycT on the right hand side. The linear effect of contin-
uous leader contributions on follower giving is statistically insigniﬁcant
for both authority leaders (AL × leader contribution) and randomly se-
lected leaders (RL × leader contribution), as are the level effects of the
leadership treatments (AL and RL). The speciﬁcation is restrictive in
that it estimates the average effect of an increase in leader contributions
on follower responses. Potential theories underlying a leadership by26 We did not vary the amount authorities and non-authorities give when they lead by
example because doing sowould require letting subjects know that the leader is not freely
choosing the amount theywish to contribute (in order to avoid using deception). Thismay
generate a different response to leadership by example and would not be able to capture
the leader response to leadership opportunities that we analyze in the previous sub-
section.example effect require neither monotonicity nor linearity in the re-
sponse function of followers. Before describing the rest of Table 5, we
turn to less parametric analyses presented in Fig. 2, which shows the fol-
lower best response function (marginal effects) to leader contributions,
including a quadratic term. The relationship is imprecisely estimated in
Panel (a), where follower response is continuous, but is similar and
more precise when follower response is binary in Panel (b). Fig. 2 sug-
gests that authority leader contributions have a positive and approxi-
mately linear effect on the probability that followers give above the
median (≥10 Bs.), while random leader contributions have a concave
effect that is increasing up to 10 Bs. To accommodate these non-
linearities, the remainder of Table 5 tests for asymmetries in the re-
sponse to high and low leader contribution, with the split at 10 Bs.
We examine the effect of high and low leader contributions on con-
tinuous follower contributions in columns 3 and 4 and categorical con-
tributions in columns 5 through 8 of Table 5. Authority leaders who give
less than 10 Bs. (coefﬁcient on AL) insigniﬁcantly decrease follower giv-
ing by approximately 1.10 Bs. (s.e. 0.90, column 4) relative to the NL
treatment. They signiﬁcantly decrease the log odds that followers give
an additional coin by 1.06 (s.e. 0.39, column 6), and signiﬁcantly reduce
the probability that follower contributions exceed the median by 18%
(s.e. 0.08, column 8). Relative to a low authority leader contribution, a
highAL contribution has a positive effect on follower contributions. Spe-
ciﬁcally, a follower of an authority who gives above the median gives
1.33 more Bs. (insigniﬁcant, column 4), has a signiﬁcant 1.31 greater
log odds of giving an additional 5 Bs. coin (column 6) and is 33% more
likely to give above the median than is a follower who observes an au-
thority leader contribute below the median (column 8).
In general, the coefﬁcients on the RL treatment variables in Table 5
are of the same sign, smaller magnitude and less precisely estimated
than the corresponding AL treatment effects. Column 8 shows that a
random leader who gives at least 10 Bs. increases the probability that
followers give at least 10 Bs. by 12.4% (s.e. 0.06) relative to theNo Leader
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Fig. 3. Information signaling and leader inﬂuence. Notes: Figures represent the marginal
effects of regression coefﬁcients for random and authority leader contributions by infor-
mation condition. See text for a description of the regression. The horizontal dashed line
provides a reference for average contributions above the median in the NL treatment
pooled across information conditions.
27 Speciﬁcally, in the described regression, the coefﬁcient on information in the NL treat-
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Fig. 2. Leader inﬂuence over followers. Notes: Figures represent themarginal effects of re-
gression coefﬁcients for random and authority leader contributions. See text for a descrip-
tion of the regressions.We present estimates for leader contributions up to 20 Bs. because
this is the region of common support (see Fig. 1, panel b).
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are seen to have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence over follower contributions.
The differences in follower behavior across leader types are statistically
imprecise; p-values from the relevant t-tests are reported in the ﬁnal
rows of Table 5. In rejection of the null hypothesis of free-riding, we
ﬁnd some evidence that follower contributions positively respond to
the example set by authority and random leaders, with relatively stron-
ger evidence for authority leaders.
4.2. Heterogeneous treatment effects
We turn next to the question of why leadership affects voluntary
contributions in our setting, by exploring treatment heterogeneities
in both leader and follower contribution decisions. First, we test
Hypothesis 4, which establishes that followers' response to leader con-
tributions does not differ based on their exposure to information. Sec-
ond, we examine heterogeneities in leader inﬂuence based on the
observable characteristics of leaders.
4.2.1. Followers: information signaling
Recall that the cross cutting informationmanipulation generated ex-
ogenous variation in the information available to study participantsabout the quality of the public good. Null Hypothesis 4 establishes that
there is no information signaling and thus no difference in the response
of informed and uninformed followers to leader contributions. The al-
ternative hypothesis is that leadership by example signals information,
so the contribution decisions of leaders have greater inﬂuence on the
decisions of uninformed followers, because uninformed followers are
more dependent on the information conveyed by the leader's decision
than are informed followers.
Fig. 3 shows themarginal effects from a regression of the probability
that the follower contributes above themedian on the three-way inter-
action of leader type, leader contribution and whether the follower re-
ceived information about the quality of the public good. As in previous
analyses, we include a full set of controls, OTB ﬁxed effects, and cluster
standard errors at the OTB level. The follower's response function to
the leader's contribution is plotted, with 90% conﬁdence intervals. The
average contribution in the No Leader treatment, which does not signif-
icantly differ across information conditions, is shown for reference by
the dashed horizontal line.27While we lack precision inmany of the rel-
evant statistical tests, we observe several suggestive patterns in follow-
er response to leader contributions across information conditionswhich
allow us to reject the null hypothesis that information does not affect
contributions.
First, when authority leaders contribute below the median, unin-
formed followers are signiﬁcantly less likely to make a contribution
above the median than are informed followers and participants in the
NL treatment.When an authoritymakes a contribution above themedi-
an, both informed and uninformed followers are more likely to make a
contribution above themedian than are individuals in the NL treatment.
Consequently, the difference in the response to the authority leader's
contribution is greater for uninformed followers, as seen by the slope
of the best response function of uninformed followers of authority
leaders in the right hand panel. Second, the differences across informa-
tion conditions in the response to a random leader's contribution are
considerably weaker and not consistent with the predictions of infor-
mation signaling. Information has a negative and signiﬁcant level effect
on follower contributions. Uninformed followers of random leaders are
more likely to make contributions above the median when the leader
contributes above themedian, both relative to the simultaneous setting
8
10
(a) Number of contribution leaders by 
authority propensity score
91B.K. Jack, M.P. Recalde / Journal of Public Economics 122 (2015) 80–93and to informed random leader contributions below themedian. Statis-
tical tests included in Appendix Table A.5 show that, with the exception
of information, the responses by leader type are statistically indistin-
guishable. We discuss reasons why our information manipulation
might be seen as a lower bound on the information signal provided by
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Fig. 4. Authority characteristics and leader inﬂuence. Notes: The top panel shows the dis-
tribution of contribution leader types across the constructed authority propensity score,
which measures how closely the contribution leader resembles an elected authority. The
bottom panel shows the marginal effects of the interaction of contribution leader type
and authority propensity score on ameasure of leader inﬂuence. See text for a description
of the regression.4.2.2. Leaders: individual characteristics
As discussed in Section 3, authorities differ from the average com-
munity member on a number of dimensions, including gender, educa-
tion, assets, and community participation (see Appendix Table A.4). As
a result, the inﬂuence of authority leaders may be driven not by the po-
sition that they hold in the community but by their observable charac-
teristics. Some relevant traits, such as education and wealth, may
allow leaders to generate better information signals, trigger more reci-
procity, and have stronger social inﬂuence regardless of their status as
elected authorities. Holding an authority position may, on the other
hand, convey an additional inﬂuence that extends beyond observable
characteristics.
Though our study is not designed to explicitly investigate how the
observable characteristics of leaders explain leadership inﬂuence (i.e.
none of our four hypotheses pertain to leader characteristics), we take
advantage of the fact that randomly selected contribution leaders vary
in the degree to which they resemble the average elected authority.
We construct an “authority propensity score” using a probit regression
of authority status on the six characteristics where authorities signiﬁ-
cantly differ from the rest of the community: gender, education, wealth,
participation in community meetings, trust in NGOs and the likelihood
that they are teachers.28 Each contribution leader is assigned an author-
ity propensity score between 0 and 1, which describes the resemblance
of each contribution leader to the average authority in the study. The
top panel of Fig. 4 shows the resulting distribution of contribution lead-
er types across the propensity score.
To directly examine the relationship between leader characteristics
and leader inﬂuence, we construct a new outcome variable: the abso-
lute difference between leader and follower contributions. The bottom
panel of Fig. 4 shows the marginal effects from a regression of this
measure of leader inﬂuence on an interaction of authority propensity
score and leadership treatment, controlling for the leader contribution
amount, individual- and session-level controls, and communityﬁxed ef-
fects, with standard errors clustered at the community level. The ﬁgure
shows that random leaders are more inﬂuential the more they look like
the typical authority in the study. At low authority propensity scores,
authorities are signiﬁcantly more inﬂuential than are random leaders.
However, random leaders who resemble the typical authority in the
study area exert an inﬂuence that is indistinguishable from that of an
authority leaderwith similar characteristics. It isworth noting that lead-
er contributions are also weakly correlated with the characteristics on
which authorities differ from other individuals. Though the regression
results shown in Fig. 4 control for leader contribution, some of the effect
of contribution leader characteristics may be due to the size of their ini-
tial contribution.
The results in Fig. 4 indicate that random leaders with authority-
like characteristics are just as inﬂuential as local authorities. This
suggests that at least some of the inﬂuence that authorities have when
they lead by example is driven by their observable characteristics, and
may indicate that communities choose their leaders based, in part,
on observable characteristics that are correlated with inﬂuential
leadership.28 Each of the covariates used in the probit regression is balanced after imposing com-
mon supports. We implement the propensity score matching using the algorithm devel-
oped by Becker and Ichino (2002). Note that authorities differ from the rest of the
population on several participation-related characteristics, including participation in
OTB meetings and projects and agreement with OTB decisions. We focus on one of these
variables: participation in OTB meetings.4.3. Robustness checks
We use two types of robustness checks to address possible selection
bias resulting from non-compliance with the assigned treatment in
some communities. First, we calculate two stage least square estimates
of treatment effects that use treatment assignment to the AL treatment
as an instrument for administered AL treatment, as follows:
yic ¼ δ1RLi þ δ2cALic þ ΓXic þ ηc þ ϵic: ð4Þ
The ﬁtted valuescALic are obtained from the ﬁrst stage regression
ALic ¼ θDic þ ΓXic þ εic ð5Þ
where Dic is an indicator for assignment to the AL treatment for individ-
ual i in community c. Second, we restrict our analysis to the sample of
communities that complied with treatment assignment and estimate
treatment effects directly as in our main speciﬁcations.
Appendix Table A.6 presents revised estimates of treatment effects
on total contributions. Overall, the results look similar to themain spec-
iﬁcations, and are stronger under the instrumental variable speciﬁcation
29 Speciﬁcally, we see that out of the full set of individual- and session-level controls, on-
ly average session-level assets measured as the raw sum of durables owned by the house-
hold is associated with leader contributions, which conﬁrms that leaders are not
systematically adjusting their behavior based on the random group of followers to which
they were assigned. The full table of results is available on request.
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tion is due to the relatively low contributions among the four replace-
ment authority leaders. The limited sample analysis sometimes lacks
statistical power because of the loss of sample size. The same robustness
speciﬁcations are carried out for the leader and follower results. These
are presented in Appendix Tables A.7 and A.8 respectively, and are
also consistent with our main results.
5. Conclusion
Local authorities in developing countries often wield substantial
power, and some evidence shows large authority ﬁxed effects in com-
munity development outcomes, including the provision of public
goods (Chattopadhyay and Duﬂo, 2004; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005).
What role do local authorities play? Can they help communities over-
come collective action problems and sustain higher levels of voluntary
public good provision? If so, how? A number of channels present them-
selves: sanctioning or rule enforcement,moral suasion, liaisonwith out-
side resources, reciprocity, and leadership by example. Our study offers
novel evidence on the latter mechanism.
We implement small group experiments in 52 communities in rural
Bolivia to examine the role that locally elected authorities play in the
voluntary provision of public goods when they lead by example. In
our setting, authorities exert a signiﬁcant inﬂuence over voluntary con-
tributions even without the ability to monitor, sanction, or coerce. On
average, total contributions increase by approximately 20% when the
group is led by an elected local authority who makes an initial public
contribution. Authorities signiﬁcantly increase their contribution deci-
sions when they lead by example relative to when they contribute in a
private, simultaneous decision setting where their contributions do
not differ from those of the average community member. Leader deci-
sions may be driven both by their anticipated effect on follower contri-
butions and by reputational considerations. Authorities also positively
inﬂuence the contribution decisions of followers, to a marginally but
insigniﬁcant greater extent than do random individuals who lead by
example. The effect on followers is driven by a combination of authori-
ties' leadership status, their contribution amounts, and their observable
characteristics.
Our design explores one of the best-studiedmechanisms underlying
a positive effect of leadership by example: information signaling. We
ﬁnd that the predictions of information signaling are consistent with
the inﬂuence that authorities have on their followers, but cannot ex-
plain all of their inﬂuence. Our information manipulation may be seen
as generating a lower bound on the true relevance of information sig-
naling for several reasons. First, we allow randomly selected followers
to inspect the environmental education books rather than providing
contribution leaders an additional informational advantage as is typical-
ly done in laboratory studies. However, if followers believe that the
leader is better able to extract information from inspection of the
books or has additional information about the books and their value,
then the information asymmetry between the leader and informed fol-
lowers may persist. Second, uninformed followers were not aware that
contribution leaders had access to additional information, which left the
existing information asymmetries between the contribution leader and
followers intact. While telling the uninformed participants that contri-
bution leaders were informed might have increased treatment effects,
it might have also generated experimenter demand effects that other-
wise biased our estimates of the natural importance of information sig-
naling in our study setting.
Methodologically, our study offers an innovative approach to study-
ing endogenously arising behavior within groups in ﬁeld settings. The
inclusion of community ﬁxed effects allows us to address many of the
concerns associated with unobservable factors driving leader and fol-
lower contributions within communities. While the use of community
ﬁxed effects eliminates endogeneity concerns at the community level,
they may still exist at the session level. We test for session levelcorrelates of leader contributions and ﬁnd only one signiﬁcant explana-
tory variable out of 13 tested.29We also borrowbest practices fromboth
the lab and the ﬁeld in a number of other design features, including pre-
cisemeasurement of selection into the study, using earnedmoney in the
voluntary contribution decision, and studying contributions that ac-
quire an actual good that beneﬁts the community. Combining the
rigor and insights of laboratory studies with the complexities of social
interactions in the ﬁeld offers a promising direction for future research.
Particularly where leadership is concerned, stepping outside of the lab-
oratory can generate insights about how actual leaders inﬂuence their
followers and how the characteristics of individuals and groups interact.
Our ﬁndings are broadly consistent with existing studies of leader-
ship in ﬁeld-lab settings, which have shown that leaders can improve
local cooperative outcomes. In rural Colombia, d'Adda (2012), for exam-
ple, shows that leaders increase total contributions in a repeated simul-
taneous donation setting when contributions are public. Kosfeld and
Rustagi (forthcoming) show that the sanctioning style of local leaders
in the lab is correlated with the cooperative success of communities in
actual conservation practices in Ethiopia. Beekman et al. (2014) show
that communities with corrupt ofﬁcials display lower levels of coopera-
tion elicited through contributions in public good games in Liberia.
These studies, like ours, raise the question of whether “good” leaders
make communities more successful at resolving local level collective
action problems or if cooperative communities elect “good” leaders to
begin with.
Our results hold constant othermeans of inﬂuence that local author-
ities have at their disposal, such as sanctioning or coercion, which may
be relatively more or less important than leadership by example in sus-
taining voluntary public good provision in other settings. In places with
less decentralization, greater heterogeneity, or more corrupt leaders,
other actors within the community may be relatively more inﬂuential
than locally elected authorities. The comparative statics we observe in
response to leadership by example may therefore generalize to other
types of opinion leaders and different forms of leadership inﬂuence.
Our methodology offers the ability to identify individual inﬂuence
over voluntary contributions at the local level, and could be applied to
settings where local leadership is less objectively deﬁned. By exploring
the causalmechanisms underlying leadership by example, we offer sug-
gestive evidence that leadership by examplemay be particularly impor-
tant where informational asymmetries are large or where opinion
leaders stand out from followers on observable characteristics. Further
research is needed to identify other mechanisms by which leadership
by example affects voluntary contributions in ﬁeld settings, and to un-
derstand its importance relative to other means of authority inﬂuence.Acknowledgments
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